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Abstract 
This article develops Foucault’s later work on ethics and his concept of ethical askesis 
in the transformation of the self as a new approach to understanding organizational 
ethics. Scholars within the field of management and organization studies have already 
proposed the development of a Foucauldian approach to ethics, but the precise nature 
of such an ‘art of living’ has yet to be clarified. To address this gap in the literature 
this article builds on Foucault’s theoretical and practical interest in the work of 
historical and contemporary social movement organizations. The article investigates 
the role that social movement organizations play as crucibles for the creation of new 
forms of organizational subjectivity and novel ethical practices. In this way the article 
develops a synthesis between the Foucauldian scholarship and social movement 
organization theory. The contribution of the article shows how social movement 
organizations act as sites for the creation of novel organizational subjectivities and 
ethical practices, and reconceptualizes organizational ethics in Foucauldian terms as a 
form of ethical askesis to transform the self. 
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Introduction 
This paper develops the idea of ‘askesis’ to reconceptualize organizational ethics, 
where ethical askesis plays a crucial role in the constitution of alternative, sometimes 
radical, forms of organizational subjectivity. Recent research within the field of 
organization studies has focused upon Foucault’s later works on ethics and its 
relevance to modern management practice. This research has called for an 
investigation of organizational ethics in terms of a ‘care of the self’ and new ways of 
‘acting and being’ (Chan & Garrick, 2002; Hancock, 2008; Iedema & Rhodes, 2010; 
Kosmala & McKernan, 2011; Randall & Munro 2010; Starkey & Hatchuel, 2002). 
This approach frames the employee as an ‘active’ ethical subject who is responsible 
for their own self-creation (Ibarra- Colado, Clegg, Rhodes & Kornberger, 2006; 
Starkey & Hatchuel, 2002). However, as yet relatively little scholarly attention has 
been devoted to the possibilities for ethical self-creation in terms of concrete 
organizational practices. 
One of the most popular themes that has been taken up by management 
scholars from Foucault’s late work on ethics is the idea that the self can be 
transformed into a work of art (Bardon & Josserand, 2011; Ibarra-Colado et al., 2006; 
Kosmala & McKernan, 2011; Loacker & Muhr, 2009). Some have objected that this 
conception of ethics is overly aesthetic and little more than dandyism (Hadot, 1995; 
Hancock, 2008). Contu (2008) observes that the call for understanding life as a 
developmental project is now the mainstay of management gurus and lifestyle 
consultants. She criticizes the notion of the ‘care of the self’ for its political naiveté, 
describing it as a kind of ‘decaf resistance’. Contu (2008, p. 274) argues that ‘Decaf 
resistance, just as decaf coffee, makes it possible for us to enjoy [resistance] without 
the costs and risks involved.’ With due consideration given to the limits of such 
‘decaf resistance’, it is the contention of the present paper that the radical potential of 
the ‘care of the self’ has yet to be revealed. Indeed, Edward Barratt’s (2008, p. 534) 
review of Foucault’s late work has highlighted the need to ‘correct one of the curious 
omissions to Foucault’s reception in organization and management studies – the 
activism at the heart of his project’. The present paper demonstrates the radical 
potential of the care of the self in terms of the ‘activist’ practices of the self of social 
movement organizations. 
Barratt is one of the few scholars to have highlighted the potential of the 
activist project to enrich our conception of organizational ethics and ‘our capacity to 
imagine other ways of organizing’ (Barratt, 2008, p. 523). His analysis only briefly 
alludes to possible avenues of investigation, commenting on the role of social 
movement organizations (SMOs) in developing a more ‘autonomous’ existence. The 
present paper addresses this ‘curious omission’ within organization studies and, 
furthermore, it shows that Foucault’s research on activism provides an excellent 
starting point to flesh out precisely what an art of living entails for organizational 
practice. This research gap is addressed in the ensuing analysis by developing the 
concept of ‘ethical askesis’ to reveal possibilities for self-creation in organizations 
beyond exploitative neoliberal mechanisms of identity formation. 
Bluhdorn (2006) has argued that social movements have a great deal to teach 
us about the creation of subjectivity, where he notes that such movements may be the 
only forum for the ‘reconstruction of the self’ beyond the hegemonic institutions of 
neoliberal capitalism. We might turn to Weber’s classic study of different Protestant 
sects in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism for an excellent precedent 
that shows how social movement organizations can dramatically influence our sense 
of self both within and outside work. Social movement theorists have noted that the 
goal of many movements is not just freedom from oppression but involves the 
freedom to create new ways of living and the ‘freedom to be’ (Cerulo, 1997; Melucci, 
1989). In this respect, Böhm, Spicer and Fleming (2008) show that existing research 
in organization studies has tended to focus upon identity formation within the 
workplace, but has neglected a whole range of active resistance that has been 
mobilized outside the workplace, particularly within the domain of social movements. 
Spicer and Böhm (2007) contend that social movement organizations act as an 
important plat- form for questioning the neoliberal discourse of management. They 
explain the success of social movement organizations in terms of their formation of 
different ethical ideals, and the ‘attempt to collectively create and experiment with 
alternative identities, aspects of the symbolic economy and cultural innovation’ 
(Spicer & Böhm, 2007, p. 1675). Following from this insight, I investigate the extent 
to which social movement organizations act as crucibles for the development of 
alternative ethical practices in organizations and different possibilities for what 
Foucault termed ‘arts of living’. 
The theoretical contribution of this paper develops Foucault’s concept of 
‘ethical askesis’ in terms of its crucial role in the constitution of alternative forms of 
organizational subjectivity. The existing scholarship in organization theory has 
already provided a rigorous account of the ways that worker subjectivities are 
controlled and disciplined by modern corporations that are framed by an ideal image 
of the productive employee (Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian & Sajay, 1998; Grey, 1994; 
McKinlay, 2002, 2012; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Rose, 1990; Savage, 1998; Starkey 
& Hatchuel, 2002; Townley, 1994). However, rather less research has been 
undertaken into the existence of alternative possibilities for self-creation beyond these 
disciplinary mechanisms. The present article addresses this research gap by 
investigating social movement organizations as a rich source for the evolution of such 
alternative forms of organizing which are based upon the creation of different forms 
of self-discipline – an alternative ‘askesis’. 
This paper demonstrates that social movement organizations have developed 
distinctive forms of self-discipline in order to challenge the dominant apparatus of 
power. The paper shows that social movement organizations are grounded in very 
particular forms of ‘askesis’ including (i) bearing witness and the ‘true life’, (ii) direct 
action, (iii) the care of the self and asceticism and (iv) the use of pleasure. These 
ethical exercises have been developed by SMOs to create ‘agents capable of 
challenging the status quo’ (Scully & Creed 2005, p. 313). In contrast to existing 
social movement theory which has focused on the material and institutional resources 
of SMOs (Campbell, 2005; McAdam & Scott, 2005), this paper focuses on forms of 
ethical self-discipline that are required for the mobilization of SMOs, or what Soule 
(2012) has termed their ‘spiritual resources’. The contribution of this inquiry is 
threefold: (i) it provides a clear account of the concept of askesis as a practice of 
ethical self-discipline; (ii) it identifies four key forms of ‘ethical askesis’ in social 
movement organizations as micro-emancipatory practices that create agents capable 
of changing the status quo; and (iii) it shows the potential of asceticism and other 
forms of askesis in the struggles of social movement organizations to create new ways 
of organizing. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, it begins by outlining a critique of the 
modern neoliberal subject, showing that it is a free and ethical being in only a very 
restrictive economic sense. Following from this critique the paper will unearth parts 
of Foucault’s genealogy of the self which have thus far been neglected within the 
field of management and organization studies, but which can provide a rich source of 
material for a more detailed understanding of organizational ethics. This account of 
ethics reveals the importance of the role of ‘ethical askesis’ in the development of 
new forms of subjectivity and organizational ethics. This begins with an account of 
the creation of novel forms of subjectivity in ancient schools of ethics, which serves 
as a basis for a more detailed study in the second half of the paper of forms of ethical 
askesis in contemporary social movement organizations. This paper argues that social 
movement organizations are characterized by inventive forms of ‘ethical askesis’, 
which can be found within a diversity of modern SMOs such as Amnesty 
International, Greenpeace, the Occupy movement and the Slow Food Society, among 
others. The final section of the paper considers the extent to which the ‘ethical 
askeses’ of social movement organizations can enrich our understanding of ethics and 
micro-emancipation in organizations. 
 
Ethics as an Art of Living in Contemporary Neoliberalism 
Within the field of organization studies numerous scholars have critically discussed 
the control of worker subjectivity, drawing on a Foucauldian perspective (Covaleski 
et al., 1998; Halsall & Brown, 2013; McKinlay, 2002, 2012; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; 
Miller & Rose, 1988; Savage, 1998; Starkey & Hatchuel, 2002; Townley, 1994). 
These studies have shown a range of practices for the discipline and control of worker 
subjectivity such as the use of ‘confessional practices’ in modern performance 
appraisal techniques to encourage workers to enumerate their performance failings 
(Findlay & Newton, 1998; Townley, 1994) and the use of the professional career 
ladder as a device for the ‘correction’ of moral character (Grey, 1994; McKinlay, 
2002, 2012; Savage, 1998). Halsall and Brown (2013, p. 238) have argued that 
pseudo-religious ascetic practices have reappeared in modern organizations as a 
‘continual test of commitment to organizational culture’. Techniques of motivation 
and cultural control have also been criticized for espousing a view of worker 
subjectivity where ‘the language of autonomy, creativity, and self-actualization in the 
work-place is illusory and the reality is one of psychological manipulation and 
control’ (Kosmala & McKernan, 2011, p. 386; also, see Rose, 1990, pp. 55–119). 
Foucault’s (2008) own analysis of modern neoliberalism suggests that there are good 
reasons to question the forms of ethical subjectivity being espoused under the 
neoliberal project. He highlighted a fundamental contradiction within the neoliberal 
discourse between its pursuit of a free economic and political subject and at the same 
time a subject that will respond only according to an economic rationality of utility 
maximization and self-investment, a self that in his words was ‘eminently govern- 
able’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 270). 
While there has been much research within management and organization 
studies following Foucault’s studies of systems of power and domination (e.g. 
Burrell, 1988; Clegg, 1994, 1998; Knights, 2002; Townley, 1994), his genealogical 
studies of forms of counter-conduct and alternative forms of ethics have received far 
less attention. Drawing on Foucault’s analysis, Dilts (2011, p. 145) has framed a 
moral impasse concerning modern neoliberal subjectivity by highlighting how 
neoliberal discourse reduces the self merely to ‘a machine for the production of an 
income,’ rather than appreciating it as an end in itself. Dilts turns to the work of the 
later Foucault who not only addressed this contradiction at the heart of the neoliberal 
project but explored alternative conceptions of the self that can be used to question 
existing conceptions of the liberal or neoliberal Homo oeconomicus. In a similar vein, 
Micki McGee (2005, p. 160) has criticized the entrepreneurial discourse on the self, 
observing that it is particularly weak in its ‘cultivation of new vocabularies’ and is 
unimaginative in the possibilities it presents for self-creation and creating new 
possibilities for others. She observes that this discourse tends to recycle white male 
stereotypes of the good life that are premised on a huge network of free labour 
performed by women, especially in the domestic realm. Despite these critical 
remarks, McGee’s (2005, p. 23) commentary on neo- liberal self-help culture argues 
that ‘the pursuit of individual self-invention continues to hold radical possibilities, 
particularly when one’s own pursuit of self-invention confounds existing societal 
expectations’. In contrast to the narrow and impoverished view of the self expounded 
in neoliberal discourses on the entrepreneur, she proposes the extraordinary life of the 
civil rights activist Malcolm X as being exemplary of an art of living. 
Within the field of organization studies, calls for practising ethics as an ‘art of 
living’ have suggested a number of different ways by which this might be 
accomplished. Foucault himself did not advocate a particular ethical position beyond 
a description of his own personal ethic as a kind of ‘pessimistic activism’ (Foucault, 
1997). His friend and colleague Paul Veyne (2010) has proposed that we understand 
Foucault’s approach as comparable to the samurai ethic but there is no suggestion 
here that such a position should be universalized, quite the contrary. Scholars within 
the field of management and organization studies have picked up on different threads 
within Foucault’s works on ethics. Some have highlighted the fact that an art of living 
prioritizes experimental ‘practices of the self’ in contrast to obedience to formal codes 
of ethics (Loacker & Muhr, 2009; Kosmala & McKernan, 2011; McMurray, Pullen & 
Rhodes, 2010; Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013). Others have highlighted the significance 
of ethical practices that create an ‘active’ self-relation in contrast to a docile or 
normalized self-relation (Ibarra-Colado et al., 2006; Iedema & Rhodes, 2010; Randall 
& Munro, 2010). One of the first scholars to introduce a Foucauldian ethics into the 
field of organization studies was Edward Wray-Bliss (2002), who suggested that such 
an approach requires questioning prevailing conceptions of the self and normality, 
where the personal is necessarily a political issue. In common with a number of other 
scholars in the field Wray-Bliss observed the importance of a critical attitude to 
processes of normalization and expert authority in such an ethics (see also Starkey & 
Hatchuel, 2002; Kosmala & McKernan, 2011; Randall & Munro, 2010). 
In the existing literature few studies clearly articulate specific practices when 
it comes to defining precisely how we might engage in ethical practices that constitute 
an art of living. Iedema and Rhodes (2010) have developed a case study of doctors 
engaged in a practice of intense self- surveillance in order to raise levels of hygiene in 
their hospital, which they argue transcended mere obedience to a code and required 
active self-formation. This study raises an issue of some significance to the present 
inquiry concerning the important role of self-discipline in the formation of both 
‘docile’ and ‘active’ subjects. Iedema and Rhodes convincingly demonstrate that such 
practices of self-surveillance can create active rather than docile ethical subjects 
among healthcare professionals; however, they do not address how this might 
transcend medicalized forms of normalization (see Foucault, 1994). Randall and 
Munro (2010) have also looked to the medical profession for examples of the ‘care of 
the self’, which can be found in practices of care in voluntary organizations. This 
study investigated how practical exercises for self-mastery were co-created by clients 
and voluntary staff as a ‘care of the self’ beyond the normalizing strictures of 
statutory health care. Starkey and Hatchuel (2002) have advocated another potentially 
fruitful avenue for the development of an art of living in terms of sporting activities 
that can constitute practices of ‘non- dogmatic normativity’. Sporting communities 
offer intriguing possibilities for pursuing an art of living detached from workplace 
domination. Nevertheless, these practices are often bound up with capitalist norms 
concerning the priority of competition and the increasing commercialization of social 
life, so even sports may be considered to be a part of the normalizing apparatus of 
post- industrial capitalism (Sage, 1990). A common theme of these nascent studies is 
a concern for the creation of an ‘active’ ethical subject, but as yet this idea has been 
advanced somewhat tentatively and is yet to be developed into a clear theoretical 
framework. 
These existing studies within the field of organization studies reveal that the 
conceptual development of Foucauldian ethics for management and organization 
studies is still very much in embryonic form. I now turn to Foucault’s own 
genealogical inquiries in order to identify the possibilities and limitations of ethics 
conceived as ‘an art of living’ within organizations. In contrast to the existing 
Foucauldian scholarship within the organization studies literature, this inquiry high- 
lights the importance of ethical askesis for the art of living and explores its potential 
for developing an alternative ethics for organization theory. 
 
The Ethics of Dissent in Ancient Greece 
We should be clear that Foucault’s project was not to resurrect long-dead concepts 
that were used to educate the Greek aristocracy, and that he was highly sceptical of 
the accounts that he analysed in his genealogy of ethics. This scepticism is clear from 
his notes on ancient systems of ethics where he remarked that ‘All of antiquity seems 
to me to have been a “profound error”’ (Foucault, 2005, p. 531). In an interview 
concerning the genealogy of ethics he described the hierarchical, masculine qualities 
of ancient ethics as being ‘quite disgusting’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 258). With these 
caveats in mind we should be wary of drawing lessons from a genealogy of ethics for 
application in the modern world, particularly in the light of contemporary hegemonic 
struggles. 
A crucial element of Foucault’s genealogy of subjectivity is his concept of 
‘ethical askesis’ and the role of different forms of askesis in the historical evolution of 
different forms of subjectivity. Foucault (2005, p. 16) defined this important concept 
as ‘a work of self on the self, an elaboration of the self by the self, a progressive 
transformation of the self by the self for which one takes responsibility in a long labor 
of ascesis (askesis)’. In contrast to ethical codes, which simply demand obedience to 
their dictates, ‘the care of the self [requires one] to attend effectively to the self, and 
to exercise and transform oneself’ (Foucault, 1985, p. 73). The concept of ethical 
askesis should not be conflated with asceticism only, and different forms of ethical 
askesis are possible. Foucault’s genealogical studies reveal that the askesis of the 
ancient Greeks was directed towards self-mastery, where the ethical exercises were 
supposed to ‘equip’ the practitioner for everyday life. Hadot (1995), whose work 
Foucault drew upon heavily, defined askesis as exercises that were developed so that 
their practitioners can learn both how to live and how to die. Foucault’s genealogical 
studies of ethical askeses demonstrated that such arts of living were implicated in the 
government of everyday life and, conversely, in the attempts to resist such 
government (which he termed ‘counter conducts’). Ethical exercises for self-
transformation are thus aimed to equip the practitioner in a particular way of living. 
Foucault’s genealogy of the ethics of ancient Greece and Rome surveys a wide range 
of philosophers including the works of Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus 
Aurelius, among others, and various schools of ethics, particularly those of the Stoics 
and the Cynics. Many of these schools were a key part of the prevailing social order 
and their representatives were often city leaders or the advisors of such leaders (the 
hegemon). He observed that the ancient Greeks believed that only those who could 
master themselves could properly be the masters of others. Greek and Roman ethics 
were very much conceived as an ethics for the ruling class, and how the masters could 
conduct themselves in order that they might also conduct others is key to this ethics. 
Foucault certainly did not wish to resurrect such an ethics in which domination was a 
key theme that ran throughout its practices. This is clear not only in direct statements 
to this effect that he made in interviews, but also in his final lecture course on the 
Cynics. The Cynic school of philosophy is one of the first instances of a widespread 
anti-institutional ethic that was concerned with a critique of the prevailing social 
order. This school is of particular interest because of the way that it mobilized a 
certain form of asceticism in its critique of the social and institutional order. With the 
Cynics the mastery of the self was required not in order to master others, as it did in 
Stoic philosophy, but as an act of permanent critique of the prevailing social order. 
Foucault (2011, p. 170) summarized the account of the way of life of the Cynic found 
in ancient commentaries in the following manner: 
 
‘The Cynic is the man with the staff, the beggar’s pouch, the cloak, the man in 
sandals or bare feet, the man with the long beard, the dirty man. He is also the 
man who roams, who is not integrated into society, has no household, family, 
hearth or country... and he is also a beggar.’ 
 
The Cynic is so named because his life resembled that of a dog (Kyon); it is a life led 
in the open, it is a life led in accordance with the dictates of one’s animal desires, 
shamelessly eating, shitting and fucking out in public. But at the same time it is a 
highly stylized and ascetic way of life. The Cynic lived in abject poverty, he lived in 
the open, subject to the vagaries of the weather, he lived outside the social order, apart 
from his family and other social groups. And moreover, he devoted his time to 
converting others to this way of life, ‘barking’ at them like a dog. Foucault 
highlighted the strict asceticism of Cynicism, where the Cynic ‘gives his whole life as 
a test’ (Foucault, 2011, p. 194). Humour also played an important role in the social 
criticism performed by the Cynic. To humiliate Diogenes and his dog-like existence, a 
citizen once threw him a bone to chew on, to which Diogenes responded by walking 
over to the man and urinating on him. 
Whereas many schools of ancient ethics aimed to educate the ruling elite of 
the city, the Cynical school was unusual in being universalist in orientation and 
explicitly critical of social elites. Cynicism was explicitly formulated in opposition to 
the prevailing social order. It manifested characteristics that were both anti-
hierarchical and anti-institutional.
1
 It also exhibited a peculiar relationship with the 
truth, which Foucault referred to as ‘the scandal of the truth’. This scandal was deeply 
bound up with revealing the animal nature of human beings and contrasting it with the 
hypocrisy of civilized morality. Foucault’s genealogy traces the mutation of ethical 
practices from the Cynic school of philosophy to the much later rebellions of the 
Protestant Reformation, and finds them alive and well in the social movements of 
more recent history. He observed that from the Cynics to modern revolutionary social 
movements a key practice of the self has entailed breaking with the prevailing 
conventions, habits and values of society and ‘bearing witness’ through one’s way of 
life. Foucault drew a parallel between Cynicism and revolutionary modes of life on 
the grounds that both highlighted what he termed the ‘scandal of the truth’ and both 
were aimed explicitly at the transformation of society and a transvaluation of values. 
He explained the importance of this distinctive form of ethical askesis by stating that 
‘one’s life bears witness, breaks, and has to break with the conventions, habits, and 
values of society’ (Foucault, 2011, p. 184). Here we have a direct connection between 
ancient Cynicism and its conception of leading the true life with modern social 
movement organizations and their conception of leading a true life, a point that will 
be returned to in greater detail later in this paper. Indeed, Foucault claimed that the 
theme of the scandal of truth is one that continually resurfaces throughout his 
genealogical studies of ethics, most especially in his historical studies of dissent. We 
will now turn to another major ethics of dissent which appears in Foucault’s 
genealogy, in his study of the rise of pastoral power and the crucial role of asceticism 
in heretical Christian sects opposed to this new power. 
 
Ethical Askesis and ‘Counter Conduct’ in Religious Social Movements 
The term ‘counter-conduct’ is one of many neologisms coined by Foucault to 
distinguish his conception of power and resistance from existing conceptual 
frameworks. He defined this phrase in relation to his concept of governmentality, 
which entails all those techniques, discourses and programmes created within a 
society for ‘the conduct of conduct’. What was at stake in the revolts of counter-
conduct that were associated with the rise of Protestantism was as much the creation 
of radical new forms of subjectivity as it was with political or economic issues. 
Foucault’s historical analysis of these radical social movements shows that the 
question of subjectivity is absolutely central to certain forms of ethical and political 
dissent. While Foucault was sceptical of grand claims pertaining to emancipation, he 
envisaged a form of critique in terms of different forms of counter-conduct and ‘the 
historical practice of revolt’ (Foucault, 2007a, p. 75). Arnold Davidson’s (2011) 
discussion of the concept of counter-conduct has identified this as being an 
undervalued aspect of Foucault’s work, which provides a ‘conceptual hinge’ linking 
his political studies with his work on ethics. 
Foucault’s (2007b) analysis identified the role of asceticism as crucial in the 
formation of radical subjectivities, where an ideal of purity was aimed at through a set 
of ascetic exercises. This asceticism was somewhat different to that practised by the 
various ancient Greek schools, where the Christian askesis involved the mortification 
of the flesh in imitation of Christ’s own suffering. Asceticism was thus not aimed 
primarily at the mastery of the self, but at the complete renunciation of the body and 
the self. The ascetic exercises of these Christian sects were anti-institutional in that no 
external guide was required for the exercise of renunciation, where the individual 
acted as their own guide in a gradual process of purification. Counter-conducts 
involved the formation of communities which propagated distinctive forms of 
religious life outside the dictates of the official Church. Foucault noted the emergence 
of a diverse number of communities such as the Anabaptists, the Brethren of the Free 
Spirit and the Society of the Poor, all of which propagated their own peculiar heresies. 
These communities challenged the pastoral authority of the Church in a variety of 
ways, such as by introducing lay confession, by refusing the sacrament, by refusing 
the baptism of children and by selecting the poorest or most debased among them to 
be their leader. These communities often challenged the status of the most oppressed 
members of society, particularly the subordinate status of women. Foucault explained 
that the Christian church was not itself formed around such an ascetic ideal, and that 
the new asceticism of these groups was radical in its challenge to the prevailing 
institutions of Christian pastoral power. These communities presented a challenge to 
basic institutions of social control including the family, the Church, feudalism and the 
merchant bourgeoisie. Each sect developed its own distinctive ascetic practices and 
conceptions of the self that gradually became involved in what Foucault (2007b) 
described as a tactical struggle whose practices were adopted either in the new 
Protestant church or incorporated in modified form within Catholicism itself. 
He argued that these revolts and the period of the Reformation were as much 
about ‘a struggle for a new subjectivity’ as about the fight against religious and 
political oppression (Foucault, 1982, p. 213). Incidentally, Foucault’s short account of 
these revolts takes a slightly different tack from Weber’s classic account set out in 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber’s analysis follows the 
transition of certain religious ideals and practices from ‘monastic asceticism’ to what 
he described as ‘worldly asceticism’. Here Weber takes Benjamin Franklin and his 
table of strictly utilitarian virtues as his exemplar, in which one can see a direct link 
between religious ascetic practice and labour as a form of ascetic practice. Labour 
was proposed as being ‘the specific defence against all those temptations of which 
Puritanism united under the name of the unclean life’ (Weber, 1939, p. 105). Weber’s 
analysis as it is presented in his book on the Protestant ethic is focused on how these 
social movements became re-institutionalized within the Church and more generally 
incorporated as a part of the ‘spirit of capitalism’.2 In contrast, Foucault focused on 
the anti-institutional force of heretical social movements. 
The tactics of counter-conduct vary depending upon the particular strategies of 
government with which they are confronted. In the ancient world the practice of 
counter-conduct took the specific form of Cynicism, whereas with the imposition of 
Christian pastoral power it took the form of a proliferation of Protestant heresies 
(Davidson, 2011). Foucault (2007b) himself traced a line from the forms of counter-
conduct that developed in the Middle Ages to more modern forms of revolutionary 
social movement. He observed that these historical events are not entirely unrelated 
and that the social movement organizations that fostered forms of counter-conduct in 
the Reformation were also active in both the American Revolution (e.g. Quakerism) 
and the French Revolution (e.g. Methodism), and these movements continue to be 
active in a modulated form in today’s SMOs. The ethical askeses developed by these 
early religious organizations have been highly influential in the development of 
modern social movement organizations such as Greenpeace and Amnesty 
International, among others. As Foucault revealed, in these organizations asceticism 
exhibited a strongly anti-institutional ethic and helped create resistant forms of 
subjectivity. We shall now turn to an analysis of the ethical askesis in modern social 
movement organizations to bring our inquiry more clearly into the present. 
 
Ethical Askesis in Social Movements: Protest as Self-Forming Activity 
Foucault’s genealogical studies of ethics highlight the relationship between power and 
the self, where any project of resistance must take into account the process of self-
formation. His genealogical studies revealed that ‘there is no first or final point of 
resistance to political power other than the relationship one has to oneself’ (Foucault, 
2005, p. 252). This genealogical approach to understanding the self highlights 
potentially ‘reversible relationships’ that provide points of resistance to the prevailing 
mechanisms of power (Foucault, 2005, p. 252). The notion of askesis is a crucial 
element in the emergence of resistance to the mechanisms of power. In his exposition 
of the emergence of early forms of governmentality Foucault (2007b, pp. 207–208) 
explained that  
 
asceticism is rather a sort of tactical element, an element of reversal... utilized 
against these [governmental] structures of power. Asceticism is a sort of 
exasperated and reversed obedience that has become egoistic self-mastery. Let’s 
say that in asceticism there is a specific excess that denies access to an external 
power. 
 
The concept of ethical askesis is therefore central to understanding Foucault’s 
conception of resistance and his identification of elements of reversibility in emerging 
structures of power, particularly with respect to the role of social movements. 
Social movement theory has analysed ethical issues in a range of diverse but 
related ways, for example, in terms of emotional ‘moral shock’ (Jasper, 1998; Jasper 
& Poulson, 1995), the framing of perceived injustice (Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta, 
2007; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996; Valverde, 1999) and, more generally, the 
sources of legitimization in the framing process (Snow, Rocheford, Worden & 
Benford, 1986; Tarrow, 2011). Melucci’s (1996) commentary on the ethics of social 
movements refers briefly to the significance of self-transformation in his discussion of 
‘spiritual’ social movements, particularly in the case of more fundamentalist groups. 
For understandable reasons, social movement theory has tended to focus on ethics in 
terms of the issue of justice, rather than in terms of processes of subjectivation that 
were the focus of Foucault’s own work on ethics. Arguably, Foucault’s position on 
ethics and subjectivity can be understood as being well suited to the study of social 
movement organizations. Paul Veyne’s (2010) book on Foucault has argued that, 
despite having left the Communist Party, Foucault maintained a great deal of 
sympathy for militant social activism. Rather than targeting broad political issues 
such as capitalist exploitation and imperialism, his own form of activism was directed 
towards more specific political targets such as campaigning for prisoners’ rights and 
against the death sentence in the social movement organization, Le Groupe 
d’Information sur les Prisons (Deleuze, 2006; Welch, 2011). He also campaigned as 
part of Le Groupe d’Information sur la Sante, an SMO dedicated to health issues such 
as the right of women to have an abortion and the healthcare of immigrants (Foucault, 
2000). It is clear from his interviews that his historical works offer no prescriptions 
for a particular way of life or a clear political agenda. However, he asserted that these 
works could provide impor- tant lessons for learning about social problems and the 
ways that these problems have developed historically. In this way, he argued, ‘my 
position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism’ (Foucault, 1997, 
p. 256). His genealogical approach to history entails a strategic conception of 
historical knowledge as part of a critical ontology of the present in order to locate 
what he termed ‘points of reversibility’ in tactical political struggles. In his 
genealogical studies he uncovered the existence of disciplinary techniques that form 
the modern docile subject, but it is his investigation of ethics and of social movements 
that more clearly revealed the ‘points of reversibility’ upon which alternative forms of 
active ethical subjectivity can develop. 
This paper will now move from Foucault’s historical analysis of the 
emergence of alternative arts of living to more recent exemplars that are to be found 
in modern social movement organizations. This analysis reveals four forms of ‘ethical 
askesis’, which are common to a number of different contemporary social movement 
organizations: (i) the askesis of ‘bearing witness’ and the ‘true life’; (ii) the askesis of 
direct action in the creation of unconventional subjectivities; (iii) the care of the self 
and culture of asceticism; and finally, (iv) the use of pleasure in social movements. 
This selection of illustrative exemplars is chosen on the grounds that they serve to 
illustrate common forms of ethical askesis that are shared by a variety of social 
movement organizations. The analysis of these ethical practices shows that the ethical 
askesis of social movement organizations offer possibilities for ‘micro-emancipation’, 
a point to which we shall return in the final part of the paper.
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Askesis i: Bearing witness in social movement organizations 
The practice of ‘bearing witness’ that we analysed earlier as a key element in Cynic 
self- transformation is a common practice in many contemporary social movement 
organizations.
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 The idea of ‘bearing witness’ as a form of critique is bound up with a 
practical conception of the ‘true life’. This theme can be found in ancient Cynicism, 
in the heretical sects of Christianity such as the Quakers and in modern social 
movement organizations such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, the International 
Red Cross and others. Pulido (2003, p. 49) has argued that the activism that is 
characteristic of the work of social movements is part of a ‘culture of truth’. Valverde 
(1999) has made a similar observation highlighting the very particular role of the 
practice of bearing witness as a means by which the memory of injustice and 
oppression is not forgotten. Practices of bearing witness concern the way in which 
memories are actively created. The significance of this practice is explained by 
Valverde (1999, p. 663) as follows: ‘The fleeting presence of justice in the work of 
social movements is effected largely through remembering the injustices and 
genocides that must never be forgotten...’ Bearing witness is an ethical practice of the 
self in which memory and justice become linked, which can be found in numerous 
social movement organizations. 
One of the earliest organizations to pioneer modern forms of bearing witness 
was an 18th-century SMO, the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 
which was established by the Quakers in order to document and publicize the horrors 
of the slave trade (Dudai, 2008; Hochschild, 2005). This abolitionist SMO developed 
forms of bearing witness that are now commonplace including the crafting of slogans, 
pamphleteering and the use of consumer boycotts. Quaker activists employed their 
remarkable business skills in creating a powerful social movement organization that 
has been described as ‘the first great social reform movement run mainly by 
businessmen’ (Hochschild, 2005, p. 127). Adam Hochschild’s (2005) exhaustive 
study of the anti-slavery movement highlights the remarkable fusion of skills that the 
Quaker community brought to the movement, deriving from their historical tradition 
of radical dissent as a Protestant sect combined with their renowned organizational 
skills that they had developed working as diligent businessmen. 
Abolitionist activism has been an object of study in a special issue of the 
Administrative Science Quarterly (King & Haveman, 2008) devoted to developing the 
links between organization theory and social movement theory. While ethical askesis 
was not the primary focus of this study of abolitionist SMOs, the study did address 
the notion of ethical askesis in its comparison of the activist practices of ‘this worldly’ 
church organizations such as the Quakers with the practices of ‘other worldly’ church 
organizations such as the Methodists. The study noted that ‘this worldly’ 
organizations developed new styles of activism, as exemplified by the legal activism 
of the Quaker community, which contrasted starkly with ‘other worldly’ SMOs that 
chose to ‘focus on perfecting their souls and developing their relationships with God’ 
(King & Haveman, 2008, p. 501). This research found that geographical regions with 
a predominance of ‘this worldly’ organizations tended to have greater success in 
terms of abolitionist activism. Of particular interest for the purposes of the present 
argument is a clear link demonstrated between the Quaker practice of ‘bearing 
witness’ and the movement’s success in developing ‘this worldly’ forms of activism. 
‘Bearing witness’ is a particularly important practice within many modern 
SMOs. For instance, the Quaker activists who founded Amnesty International and 
Greenpeace incorporated the practice of ‘bearing witness’ as an integral aspect of 
their organizational cultures (Carmin & Balser, 2002; Hopgood, 2006). Hopgood’s 
(2006, p. 14) account of the organizational culture at Amnesty described the central 
role of this ethical practice in the following terms: ‘Bearing witness became research, 
the documentation of individual cases and the recording of human rights abuses on a 
country by country basis. At the core of everything Amnesty has done lies this 
method of human rights activism.’ Hopgood describes Amnesty International as a 
‘secular religion’ that draws on Quaker practices such as bearing witness as being 
foundational to its organizational culture as well as for the establishment of its moral 
authority in the eyes of outsiders. 
The modern environmental SMO Greenpeace also draws on Quakerism for its 
philosophical inspiration, especially with respect to the key importance of the values 
of peace, nonviolent action and its dedication to bearing witness (Carmin & Balser, 
2002). Several of its founding members were Quakers, who synthesized their 
religious and environmental beliefs into the unique activist philosophy that grounds 
both Greenpeace’s strategy and its ethics. Carroll and Ratner (1999) explain that 
Greenpeace’s ethics have developed from a diverse range of sources including 
Quakerism, deep ecology and Leninism. This environmental SMO has been a pioneer 
in the use of modern communications technologies such as television and the Internet 
to further amplify their activities in bearing witness. Carroll and Ratner (1999, p. 8) 
have explained that Greenpeace’s unique strategy was forged in the organization’s 
earliest campaigns against nuclear weapons testing, where ‘The decision to sail a boat 
into the Alaska test zone was philosophically grounded in the Quaker tradition of 
“bearing witness”, which continues to provide a rationale of Greenpeace- sponsored 
direct actions.’ They have thus developed a highly effective bricolage (Campbell, 
2005) of activist practices that have been synthesized to bear witness to acts of 
environmental devastation and to raise people’s consciousness of ecological issues. 
We can therefore see that the askesis of ‘bearing witness’ appears to be a common 
type of ethical exercise that has appeared in different forms from the Cynics to 
modern-day SMOs. 
 
Askesis ii: Direct action in the creation of unconventional subjectivities 
Participation in direct action is a common kind of askesis of social movements in 
general (Melucci, 1988; Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Alberto 
Melucci’s (1996, p. 379) commentary on social movements observed that the practice 
of direct action entails a constructive dimension to the extent that ‘it seeks to create 
new institutions parallel to those being contested or resisted’. In a similar manner, 
Jean-Paul Sartre explained the significance of direct action, arguing that it ‘expanded 
the field of the possible’ (quoted in Ross, 2002, p. 32). Direct action is not only an 
important tactic for marginalized groups with few resources, but also with respect to 
an essential departure from the prevailing social norms in the creation of 
‘unconventional’ forms of subjectivity and ways of life (Calhoun, 1993). 
Numerous commentators on social movement organizations have observed 
that a common aim of participation in activism is the achievement of autonomous 
self-management (Böhm, Dinerstein & Spicer, 2010; Calhoun, 1993; Deslandes & 
King, 2006; Hardt & Negri, 2009). In this respect, direct participation in self-
government may be understood as being both a means and an end of activism. 
Autonomous self-government is not simply assumed, but requires the creation of an 
active subject precisely to the extent that it requires direct participation. The link 
between identity and participation in direct action has been highlighted by numerous 
authors in a variety of ways, noting that the more successful social movements are in 
the construction of a collective identity, the more likely they are to engender 
participation (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Hunt & Benford, 2007; Tarrow, 2011). 
Participation has been identified as being a crucial exercise for developing a sense of 
solidarity and belonging (Hunt & Benford, 2007). Tarrow (2011, p. 152) has noted 
that a great deal of identity work is done within social movements to build a sense of 
solidarity through which these movements can mobilize activism. Many scholars have 
highlighted the importance of distinguishing clearly between ‘them’ and ‘us’ in 
collective identity formation, where ‘exclusive identities’ (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; 
Goodwin, 2004) or ‘oppositional identities’ (Hunt & Benford, 2007) were generally 
more successful in motivating direct participation in forms of activism. Hunt and 
Benford (2007) note that oppositional identities are often imposed from the outside, 
but are then drawn upon in the mobilization of the movement itself such as in the case 
of the gay rights movement. 
The necessity of exclusivity in collective identity formation is debatable. The 
exemplary analysis of the May ’68 social movement by Kristen Ross (2002) explains 
that one of its key motivating factors was its inclusiveness and the diversity of the 
protestors across social boundaries. Ross has identified numerous practices of direct 
action that are constitutive of activist subjectivity, including the mass march, the 
creation of the barricade, the street battle, the occupation of official state offices and 
buildings, workers’ strikes and the creation of slogans. In addition to such practices 
she also identified a variety of practices that were peculiar to the events of May ’68 
itself, and in particular the process of ‘disidentification’ that was aimed at radical 
equality, presenting a direct challenge to established forms of professional expertise. 
This entailed a rejection of existing social labels by means of which individuals 
understood themselves (such as the categories of the student, the worker, the 
intellectual, and so on). The process of disidentification was an ethical exercise 
designed to disrupt existing social categories and build solidarity in activism between 
diverse social groups. 
In keeping with Ross’s analysis, a more general empirical study by Hensby, 
Sibthorpe and Driver (2012) has found that a significant proportion of members of 
social movement organizations belong to more than one SMO and that they often 
participate in direct action with other allied organizations. Calhoun’s (1993, p. 408) 
historical study of social movements noted that even in the social movements of the 
19th century ‘multiple membership, either simultaneous or serial [of different 
movements], was common’. More recent research into social movement organizations 
has been critical of the lack of participation by members where a link has been 
suggested between the growing professionalization of social movements and so-called 
‘cheque book activism’ (Hensby et al., 2012; Jordan & Malony, 2006). This criticism 
is precisely concerned with the danger that participation in a social movement can 
become little more than a branding exercise rather than being a genuinely self-
forming activity. Now that we have examined the general ethical askesis of ‘bearing 
witness’ and ‘direct action’ we will turn to an analysis of the role of asceticism itself 
in SMOs. 
 
Askesis iii: The care of the self and asceticism 
A culture of self-sacrifice is a common theme in SMOs. Social movement 
organizations often require a great deal of self-discipline of their members that 
involves distinctive forms of ‘care of the self’. Hopgood’s (2006) account of the 
organizational culture of Amnesty International has observed that self-denial and 
personal sacrifice were seen as important organizational values. Hopgood (2006) 
highlights the origins of the organization in Quakerism, which is renowned for its 
disciplined working ethos and strict asceticism. The organization’s members 
legitimize their ‘culture of sacrifice’ by explaining that life is far worse for the victims 
on behalf of whom they campaign. The moral authority of this SMO is grounded in its 
strict requirement of independence, and the suppression of emotions and personal 
opinions in the pursuance of its objectives. There is an expectation of ‘self-disciplined 
persistence’ among its members where successful campaigns are understood to be all 
too rare (Hopgood, 2006, p. 101). 
The Occupy movement provides another excellent example of the significance 
of asceticism in SMOs. Occupy emerged in part from a call from the Adbusters group 
to launch a protest outside Wall Street on 13 July 2011, but this soon gathered 
momentum and many more encampments quickly sprang up elsewhere. Writing one 
year later, Paul Mason (2012) counted the formation of Occupy encampments in 962 
cities across 85 different countries. Much of the existing work on Occupy has focused 
upon its tactical aspects, highlighting the fact that this movement has emerged in a 
variety of geographical spaces involving alliances with a wide range of social groups 
(Croatoan, 2012; Mason, 2012; Soule, 2012). Some have noted the novelty of the 
movement in developing new tactics of protest and ‘weapons of the weak’ (Soule, 
2012; Treibitz, 2012). This includes the novel use of social media such as Twitter and 
Facebook in coordinating the protests, the decision to create their own autonomous 
media in disseminating their message, the release of video footage onto YouTube of 
the protests that immediately went viral, the ‘human microphone’ as a means of 
communication and learning, and a proliferation of occupation tactics for resisting 
house repossessions (Treibitz, 2012).
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 In important respects the tactics that have been 
developed by the Occupy movement are instances of the kinds of ethical askeses that 
have been identified in the preceding analysis of ‘direct action’ and of ‘bearing 
witness’ to perceived injustice. 
Several commentaries on the Occupy movement have examined the self-
discipline of its participants, which are very revealing about the relationship between 
SMO tactics and their effects as practices of self-transformation. Ruggerio (2012, p. 
16) argues that the Occupy movement’s ‘most radical message is its incitement to 
change ourselves, individually, in the workplace and socially’. Other commentators 
who have been directly involved in the movement have commented upon the practice 
of occupation as both a tactic and as a practice of self-transformation. Stronzake 
(2012, p. 118) describes the practice of occupation in the following way: 
 
‘In this process of concrete appropriate, reflection and new action, the human 
agent is transformed. The act of changing the world also transforms the human 
who is working for change... the shift in perspective, slowly occupies the person... 
The occupation is a first step in the learning process’. 
 
Stronzake describes ‘norms of conviviality’ for everyday living that were established 
as the occupa- tion grew and were considered to be very much at the heart of the 
movement itself. These norms included practices of non-violence, caring for others 
and radical consensus making (Cornell, 2012; Maharawal, 2013). Many accounts 
highlight the affective and ascetic aspects of the occupation: 
 
‘...there is an ascetic element in the Occupy movement. By facing all the weathers 
in the open, the occupiers showed that they were willing to suffer to say their 
piece to Wall Street... suffering was a verification of the worth of the political 
message that is being expressed. Similar stories of ascetic suffering could be told 
at the other Occupy sites.’ (Caffentzis, 2012, pp. 394–395) 
 
The asceticism of suffering has also been addressed with respect to the role of 
nonviolence in the Occupy movement. McVeigh (2011) observed that the protest 
tactics required great self-discipline to remain nonviolent, particularly when the 
protestors were themselves subjected to heavy-handed treatment by the police. In 
Zuccotti Park activists developed exercises to help relax themselves and master their 
fears when tensions were high by forming massage and meditation circles (Schneider, 
2011). Occupation has become a training ground in self-mastery, in terms of 
controlling one’s passions, in caring for oneself and caring for others. 
Asceticism has been identified in previous research as being essential to the 
development of capitalism (Halsall & Brown, 2013; Weber, 1939); however, in 
SMOs such as Amnesty International and the Occupy camps this particular form of 
askesis has been turned towards ethical and emancipatory projects. Foucault’s 
(2007b) own analysis of power has highlighted the important role of asceticism as a 
tactical point of ‘reversibility’ in the struggles of resistance against the apparatus of 
power, a point to which we shall return in greater detail below. We shall now turn to 
an analysis of a somewhat different kind of ethical askesis, where the care of the self 
has been conceived less in terms of ascetic deprivation and more in terms of the 
cultivation of the senses. 
 Askesis iv: The uses of pleasure in Slowfood 
An important dimension of ethical askesis can be characterized by what Foucault 
(1985) has termed ‘the use of pleasure’.6 In contrast to the strict asceticism of the 
Occupy movement, the use of pleasure is perhaps better exemplified by the activism 
of the Slow Food movement. A recent study of the Slow Food movement has focused 
upon the institutional aspects of the movement’s success, but it also makes tangential 
reference to the ethical askesis that provides the grounds for this movement (Van 
Bommel & Spicer, 2011). This research explains that ‘The quality of food and the 
sensual pleasure and enjoyment to be derived from eating (and drinking) was at the 
core of the movement in its early period’ (Van Bommel & Spicer, 2011, p. 1726). The 
practical exercises to intensify one’s experiences of ‘tasting’ are precisely self-
forming exercises that become the basis of the members’ experience of subjectivity, 
as well as constituting the collective identity of the movement itself. 
If we turn to Foucault’s (1985, 1986) own genealogical analyses of self-care 
and ethical askesis, a significant portion of this work is devoted to the study of the 
dietary regimen and the uses of pleasure in Greco-Roman conceptions of self-mastery 
and ethics. Panagia (2009) has argued that the aims of the Slow Food movement and 
the exercises that it has developed for relearning how to taste and experience pleasure 
can be explicitly understood in terms of Foucault’s concept of a ‘care of the self’. 
Like Van Bommel and Spicer (2011), Panagia (2009) describes the success of Slow 
Food in terms of its novel organizational structure, building networks of alliances 
between local regional and international institutions, but the latter also highlights the 
importance of self- transformation in this movement, especially with respect to ‘the 
education of the senses’ (Panagia, 2009, p. 142), retraining people how to taste and 
how to enjoy the pleasures of ‘conviviality’. The Slow Food movement has developed 
a series of exercises to transform their members’ experience of taste and intensify 
their appreciation of the pleasure of food (SlowFood, 2010). This entails exercises to 
test and enhance one’s sensory experiences including: (i) the testing of five taste 
sensations (sweet, salty, sour, bitter and umami); (ii) the testing of one’s experience of 
different aromas in terms of their intensity and duration; (iii) the testing of one’s 
experience of trigeminal sensations and texture; (iv) the testing of one’s perception of 
the sound of foodstuffs (e.g. crunchy); and (v) the testing of one’s visual sensations 
(e.g. smooth and rough). This series of exercises is designed to transform one’s 
experience of taste and appreciation of the pleasure of food. This alternative care of 
the self and its emphasis on ‘slowness’ is explicitly directed in opposition to the fast 
food and fast lifestyles that have thrived under post-industrial capitalism where we 
have become ‘enslaved by speed’ (Panagia, 2009; SlowFood, 2009). This SMO does 
not reject capitalism in toto, but it challenges certain aspects of modern consumer 
capitalism and has endeavoured to create an alter- native relationship between 
consumption and the self where ‘the slow diet weaves ethical relation- ships between 
self and convivial others, between self and cultural heritage, between self and 
biodiverse environment’ (Paxson, 2005, p. 17). The distinctive use of pleasure within 
the Slow Food movement is both an ethical askesis and a key element in the 
mobilization of activism in the movement itself (Hayes-Conroy & Martin, 2010). 
In this analysis I have identified four forms of ethical askesis that are 
commonly found within contemporary SMOs: (i) bearing witness and the ‘true life’: 
(ii) direct action and the ‘unconventional’ self; (iii) the care of the self and asceticism; 
and (iv) the use of pleasure in social movements. The key findings of the above 
analysis are summarized in Table 1 in terms of the forms of ethical askesis, the 
organizational practices demanded by each particular askesis, and the particular 
SMOs that are founded on the use of such ethical exercises. The ethical exercises of 
these SMOs are not aimed at forming ‘normalized’ organizational subjects, but at 
cultivating ‘unconventional’ forms of subjectivity that present new ways of living and 
challenging the status quo. This analysis has provided only a limited inquiry into 
forms of subjectivation within social movement organiza- tions to give an indication 
of their significance as crucibles for the creation of alternative ethical practices. 
Future research could explore a more detailed analysis of processes of ethical 
subjectiva- tion within specific social movement organizations, the possibilities for 
which are discussed at the end of this paper. In the following section I turn to a 
discussion of how these ethical askeses can enrich the debate within organization 
studies of the notions of ethics and ‘micro-emancipation’ (Alvesson & Willmott, 
1992; Spicer, Alvesson & Karreman, 2009). 
 
Table 1. Forms of Ethical Askesis in SMOs. 
 
 
Forms of 
Askesis 
Ethical Exercises in Organizations Exemplary SMOs 
i) Bearing 
Witness 
Preservation of memories of injustice 
Creating a culture of truth  
Leading a ‘true life’  
Amnesty International 
Greenpeace 
Gay and Lesbian SMOs 
Society for the Abolition 
of Slavery 
Ancient Cynic school 
ii) Direct 
Action 
Public protesting and campaign 
mobilization 
Participating in autonomous self 
management 
Occupy SMOs 
Amnesty International 
International Red Cross 
Greenpeace 
Society for the Abolition 
of Slavery 
iii) Care of Self: 
Asceticism 
Suffering to speak 
A culture of sacrifice 
Occupy SMOs 
Amnesty International 
Mastering the discomforts of ‘bearing 
witness’ and mastering fears 
Practicing conviviality with others 
Ancient Cynic schools 
iv) Use of 
Pleasure 
Exercising to intensify the senses 
Practicing the pleasures of 
conviviality (e.g. slowness) 
Preserving local knowledge of 
convivial practices  
Slowfood Society 
Gay and Lesbian SMOs 
 
 
 
Remarks on Micro-Emancipation and the ‘Undefined Work of Freedom’ 
Foucault’s genealogy of ethical askesis is part of a broader critical project to explore 
what he termed the ‘undefined work of freedom’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 316). This 
ethical project centres upon the transformation of the self and an experimental ‘art of 
living’. Understanding ethics as an art of living has much to learn from social 
movement theorists who have already observed that SMOs are concerned with the 
creation of new ways of living and the ‘freedom to be’ (Cerulo, 1997; Melucci, 1989). 
The present paper has mapped out this ‘freedom to be’ in terms of the ethical askeses 
that are created by SMOs in their emancipatory projects to challenge the dominant 
apparatus of power.  
We might compare the practice of micro-emancipation with Foucault’s call for 
an ethics of ‘pessimistic activism’. Whereas Alvesson and Willmott (1992, 2002) 
have focused upon sources of micro-emancipation from within the corporation, the 
present study has focused upon sources of micro-emancipation that have developed 
outside the corporation, where SMOs provide a rich source of possibility for the 
development of alternative ethical exercises as well as opening up tactical points of 
reversibility to dominant neoliberal forms of subjectivity. This paper has shown that 
the ethical askeses of SMOs can serve as a practical basis for organizational ethics 
and practices of micro-emancipation. This entails not only a tactical consideration of 
what Alvesson and Willmott (1992) call ‘loopholes’ within the dominant social order, 
but also practices that are them- selves a kind of self-forming exercise – an ethical 
askesis. In his commentary on the emancipatory potential of the Occupy movement, 
Zizek (2012, p. 82) has remarked upon the ‘urgent need for new forms of discipline 
and organization’. He notes that this is precisely the point of Foucault’s later works 
that investigate the way in which self-discipline can create an ‘excess’ that leads to a 
radical rupture in the hegemonic apparatus of power (Zizek, 2012, pp. 107–108). 
Scholars within the field of organization studies have already raised the 
phenomenon of cynicism and ‘cynical distance’ as presenting a major obstacle to any 
emancipatory project within organizations (Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Spicer et al., 
2009). Most notably, Spicer et al. (2009, p. 542) have criticized the sub-genre of 
critical management studies for having a largely negative orientation, which they 
argue has led to a certain cynical distance to the practice of management ‘without 
taking responsibility for what is replacing it’. The forms of ethical askeses that have 
been identified in the present paper are characteristic of the ‘engaged’ activism of 
SMOs, and to this extent such practices directly address and counter this problem of 
‘cynical distance’. In contrast to the ‘cynical distance’ that serves to undermine 
resistance to power within organizations, the alternative forms of self-discipline and 
practices of engaged activism that are found in SMOs can reactivate alternative 
projects for the cultivation of an active ethical self (Huault, Peret & Spicer, 2014; 
Spicer & Böhm, 2007; Böhm et al., 2008; King & Haveman, 2008; Soule, 2012). 
The genealogical approach to ethics offered by Foucault reveals how social 
movement organizations can become crucibles for the creation of new forms of living 
and ethical practices. In the terminology of organization studies such an approach 
serves to broaden the ‘repertoire of alternatives’ (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992, p. 450) 
that are available for understanding issues of ethics and micro-emancipation in 
organizations. In this light, organization studies, and especially its conception of 
micro-emancipation, can be enriched by conceiving of micro- emancipation as a form 
of ethical askesis. This paper has revealed a range of alternative ethical exercises that 
could form the grounds for practices of micro-emancipation, including (i) bearing 
witness and the ‘true life’, (ii) direct action, (iii) the care of the self and asceticism, 
and (iv) the use of pleasure in social movements. Foucault himself highlighted the 
crucial link between power and subjectivity in the identification of ‘reversible 
relationships’ that provide points of resistance to prevailing regimes of 
governmentality (Foucault, 2005, p. 252). The concept of askesis is a key element of 
Foucault’s conception of resistance to power, where he observed that ‘in asceticism 
there is a specific excess that denies access to an external power’ (Foucault, 2007b, 
pp. 207–208). 
This inquiry has demonstrated that social movement organizations are 
crucibles for the creation of different ethical askeses that run counter to the prevalent 
hegemonic forms of neoliberal subjectivity. A path-breaking book devoted to 
exploring the links between organization studies and social movement research has 
already highlighted the need to investigate the ‘processes by which people are 
transformed into agents able to challenge the status quo’ (Scully & Creed, 2005, pp. 
312–313). The present study shows that SMOs have developed forms of ethical 
exercise to foster organizational subjectivities that act as points of resistance to power 
in their creation of unconventional ways of living. 
 
Conclusions: Possibilities for an Art of Living 
This paper has taken up the call within management and organization studies to 
explore Foucault’s genealogy of ethics to provide a rich conceptual framework for 
studying organizational ethics in terms of a ‘care of the self’ and as an ‘art of living’ 
(Barratt, 2008; Starkey & Hatchuel, 2002). The concern has already been raised that 
such calls may lack critical content and amount to little more than a kind of ‘decaf 
resistance’ (Contu, 2008). This paper highlights the importance of social movement 
organizations in the creation of ethical askeses that offer ‘points of reversibility’ in the 
hegemonic forms of power. The inquiry has revealed that modern social movement 
organizations are grounded in particular forms of ethical ‘askesis’ including (i) 
bearing witness and the ‘true life’, (ii) direct action, (iii) the care of the self and 
asceticism, and (iv) the use of pleasure. These organizational practices are ethical 
exercises that have been developed by SMOs to cultivate ‘unconventional’ forms of 
subjectivity (Calhoun, 1993) and create agents capable of challenging the status quo 
(Scully & Creed, 2005). 
The paper demonstrates that social movement organizations provide a fertile 
ground for developing alternative conceptions of ethics. In contrast to existing social 
movement research that has focused on the material and institutional resources on 
which SMOs build (Campbell, 2005; McAdam & Scott, 2005), this paper has 
investigated the forms of self-discipline and the ‘spiritual resources’ (Soule, 2012) 
that SMOs mobilize in undertaking their work. Whereas existing research has focused 
upon discipline as a source of subjection to the apparatus of power, this inquiry has 
focused upon the specific forms of ethical self-discipline in SMOs that possess 
emancipatory potential. The contribution of this inquiry is threefold: (i) it provides a 
clear account of the concept of ‘ethical askesis’ as a practice of ethical self-discipline; 
(ii) it identifies four key forms of ethical askesis in social movement organizations as 
micro-emancipatory practices that create agents capable of changing the status quo; 
and (iii) it shows the potential of asceticism and other forms of askesis in the struggles 
of social movement organizations in the creation of new ways of organizing. 
This paper raises a number of research questions and avenues for exploration 
for future studies in the area of organizational ethics. One avenue of future research is 
the investigation of how social movement organizations act as crucibles for the 
creation of alternative ethical askeses and forms of subjectivity, and how such askeses 
might act as points of resistance. Future research should develop more detailed 
empirical studies of the ethical practices of the self in specific SMOs. As Soule (2012) 
has already noted, the ‘spiritual resources’ of SMOs are in need of further 
investigation, and one path for undertaking this is through an inquiry into the ethical 
askeses that help cultivate these resources. The work on ‘cynical distance’ could be 
fruitfully explored, drawing upon the concept of askesis by investigating the 
relationship between cynical distance in organizations and forms of identity work 
outside the workplace, especially in social movement organizations. Avenues of 
inquiry for future research could also examine the extent to which the unconventional 
subjectivities created by SMOs act as points of resistance to the neoliberal apparatus 
of power. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editorial team for their 
constructive comments and insightful suggestions. I would also like to thank the 
following scholars for their feedback in the development of the ideas presented in this 
paper: Silvia Jordan, Albrecht Becker, Martin Messner, Steffen Böhm, Chris Land, 
Torkild Thanem, Christian Huber and Rita Samiolo. 
 
Funding 
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, 
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 
 
Notes 
1. This conception of cynicism is quite different from the commonsense 
conception of modern cynicism. In contrast to ancient Cynicism, variants of modern 
cynicism may well operate as a cultural adjunct of power, allowing for its 
uninterrupted operation. See Fleming and Spicer (2003) for an exemplary 
commentary on this form of ‘cynical distance’. This ancient school of Cynicism can 
be understood as an expression of ‘strong’ cynicism, in contrast to more modern 
forms of ‘weak’ cynicism which do not demand radical social critique of its 
practitioners (e.g. see Sloterdijk, 1988). 
2. It is true that Weber deals with the anti-institutional, charismatic aspects of 
religious social movements in other works, notably in his The Sociology of Religion 
(1922/1993) and in Economy and Society (see Weber, 1991), where he defines 
charismatic leadership very much in terms of its power to de-institutionalize the 
prevailing social order, and its capacity for a ‘transvaluation of values’. In his works 
on religion he notes that charisma played an important role in Protestant sects and 
their use of lay preachers whose right to speak came from a state of grace rather than 
from a church ordinance. However, he is more concerned to point out that 
Protestantism ultimately succeeded in doing away with magic and hence charisma, 
leaving behind the shell of ‘worldly asceticism’, which would find an important role 
as a spiritual mirror for the division of labour (e.g. see Weber, 1939, pp. 102–125). 
3. I focus on these forms of ethical askesis for illustrative purposes, while 
recognizing the necessity of a more detailed empirical study of ethical subjectivation 
that might be found in specific social movement organizations. 
4. We might note that the etymology of the term ‘protest’ is derived from the 
Latin pro testis – ‘bear witness’. 
5. These tactics include squatting in repossessed housing, the construction of 
‘occupied real estate agencies’ and the deployment of ‘For Squat’ signs (Treibitz, 
2012). 
6. The use of pleasure was identified by Foucault (1985, 1986) as a major 
component of Greek and Roman exercises of self-mastery (askeses). He noted that a 
crucial difference between ancient ethics and modern ethics is that in the former the 
focus was less on forbidding pleasures that were good or bad in themselves, but rather 
that one did not become a slave to one’s pleasures (e.g. in dietetics and sexual 
practices). His genealogical studies uncovered a wide variety of ethical systems which 
developed radically different exercises for the use of pleasure and the related 
cultivation of self-mastery. 
 
References 
Alvesson, M., & Willmott, H. (1992). On the idea of emancipation in management 
and organization studies. Academy of Management Review, 17, 432–464. 
Alvesson, M., & Willmott, H. (2002). Identity regulation as organizational control: 
Producing the appropriate individual. Journal of Management Studies, 39, 619–644. 
Bardon, T., & Josserand, E. (2011). A Nietzschean reading of Foucauldian thinking: 
Constructing a project of the self within an ontology of becoming. Organization, 18, 
497–515. 
Barratt, E. (2008). The later Foucault in organization and management studies. 
Human Relations, 61, 515– 537. 
Bluhdorn, I. (2006). Self-experience in the theme park of radical action? Social 
movement and political articulation in the late-modern condition. European Journal of 
Social Theory, 9(1), 23–42. 
Böhm, S. Spicer, A., & Fleming, P. (2008). Infra-political dimensions of resistance to 
international business: A Neo-Gramscian approach. Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, 24, 169–182. 
Böhm, S. Dinerstein, A., & Spicer, A. (2010). (Im)possibilities of autonomy: Social 
movements in and beyond capital, the state and development. Social Movement 
Studies, 9(1), 17–32. 
Burrell, G. (1988). Modernism, postmodernism and organizational analysis: The 
contribution of Michel Foucault. Organization Studies, 9, 221–235. 
Caffentzis, G. (2012). In desert cities. In K. Khatib, M. Killjoy & M. McGuire (Eds.), 
We are many: Reflections on movement strategy from occupation to liberation (pp. 
389–398). Oakland, CA: AK Press. 
Calhoun, C. (1993). New social movements of the early nineteenth century. Social 
Science History, 17, 385– 427. 
Campbell, J. (2005). Where do we stand? Common mechanisms in organizations and 
social movement research. In G. Davis, D. McAdam, W. Scott & M. Zald, Social 
movement organization theory (pp. 41–68). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Carmin, J., & Balser, D. (2002). Selecting repertoires of action in environmental 
movement organizations. Organization and Environment, 15, 365–388. 
Carroll, W., & Ratner, R. (1999). Media strategies and political projects: A study of 
social movements. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 24, 1–34. 
Cerulo, K. (1997). Identity construction: New issues, new directions. Annual Review 
of Sociology, 23, 385– 409. 
Chan, A., & Garrick, J. (2002). Organization theory in turbulent times. Organization, 
9, 683–701.  
Clegg, S. (1994). Weber and Foucault: Social theory for the study of organizations. 
Organization, 1(1), 149–178. 
Clegg, S. (1998). Foucault, power and organizations. In A. McKinlay & K. Starkey 
(Eds.), Foucault, management and organization theory (pp. 29–48). London: SAGE 
Publications.  
Contu, A. (2008). Decaf resistance: On misbehavior, cynicism, and desire in liberal 
workplaces. Management Communication Quarterly, 21, 364–379.  
Cornell, A. (2012). Consensus: What it is, what it is not, where it came from and 
where it must go. In K.Khatib, M. Killjoy & M. McGuire (Eds.), We are many: 
Reflections on movement strategy from occupation to liberation (pp. 163–173). 
Oakland, CA: AK Press.  
Covaleski, M., Dirsmith, M., Heian, J., & Sajay, S. (1998). The calculated and the 
avowed: Techniques of discipline and struggles over identity in big six public 
accounting firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 293–327.  
Croatoan (2012). Who is Oakland: Anti-oppression activism, the politics of safety, 
and state occupation. In K. Khatib, M. Killjoy & M. McGuire (eds) We Are Many: 
Reflections on Movement Strategy from Occupation to Liberation (pp. 81–87). 
Oakland, CA: AK Press.  
Davidson, A. (2011). In praise of counter-conduct. History of the Human Sciences, 
24(4), 25–41.  
Deleuze, G. (2006). Foucault and prisons. In Two regimes of madness: Texts and 
interviews, 1975–1995 (pp.272–281). London: Semiotext(e).  
Della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2006). Social movements: An introduction, 2nd edition. 
Oxford: Blackwell.  
Deslandes, A., & King, D. S. (2006). Autonomous activism and the global justice 
movement: Aesthetic reflexivity in practice. Journal of Sociology, 42, 310–327.  
Dilts, A. (2011). From ‘entrepreneur of the self’ to ‘care of the self’: Neo-liberal 
governmentality and Foucault’s ethics. Foucault Studies, 12, 130–146.  
Dudai, R. (2008). The long view: Human rights activism, past and present. Journal of 
Human Rights, 7, 299–309.  
Findlay, P., & Newton, T. (1998). Re-framing Foucault: The case of performance 
appraisal. In A. McKinlay & K. Starkey (Eds.), Foucault, management and 
organization theory (pp. 211–229). London: SAGE Publications.  
Fleming, P., & Spicer, A. (2003). Working at a cynical distance: Implications for 
power, subjectivity and resistance. Organization, 10, 157–179.  
Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. In H. L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics (pp. 208–226). Hemel Hempstead, 
UK: Harvester Press.  
Foucault, M. (1985). The history of sexuality, vol. 2: The use of pleasure. London: 
Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (1986). The history of sexuality, vol. 3: The care of the self, London: 
Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (1994). The politics of health in the eighteenth century. In P. Rabinow 
(Ed.), Michel Foucault: Power (pp. 90–105). London: Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (1997). On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of work in progress. In 
P. Rabinow (Ed.) Michel Foucault: Ethics, subjectivity and truth (pp. 253–280). 
London: Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (2000). Summoned to court. In J. Faubian (Ed.), Michel Foucault: Power 
(pp. 423–425). London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (2005). The hermeneutics of the subject: Lectures at the College de 
France 1981–1982. New York: Picador. 
Foucault, M. (2007a). What is critique? In The politics of truth (pp. 41–81). London: 
Semiotext(e).  
Foucault, M. (2007b). Security, territory, population: Lectures at the College de 
France 1977–1978. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.  
Foucault, M. (2008). The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978–
1979. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.  
Foucault, M. (2011). The courage of truth: Lectures at the College de France 1983–
1984. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.  
Goodwin, J. (2004). Review essays: What must we explain to explain terrorism? 
Social Movement Studies, 3, 259–265.  
Goodwin, J., Jasper J., & Polletta, F. (2007). Emotional dimensions of social 
movements. In D. Snow, S. Soule & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to 
social movements (pp. 413–432), 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  
Grey, C. (1994). Career as a project of the self and labour process discipline. 
Sociology, 28, 479–497.  
Hadot, P. (1995). Philosophy as a way of life. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  
Halsall, R., & Brown, M. (2013). Askesis and organizational culture. Organization, 
20, 233–255.  
Hancock, P. (2008). Embodied generosity and an ethics of organization. Organization 
Studies, 29, 1357–1373. Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2009). Commonwealth. Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.  
Hayes-Conroy, A., & Martin, D. (2010). Mobilising bodies: Visceral identification in 
the Slow Food movement. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 35, 
269–281.  
Hensby, A., Sibthorpe, J., & Driver, S. (2012). Resisting the ‘protest business’: 
Bureaucracy, post-bureaucracy and active membership in social movement 
organizations. Organization, 19, 809–823.  
Hochschild, A. (2005). Bury the chains: The British struggle to abolish slavery. 
London: Pan Books.  
Hopgood, S. (2006). Keepers of the flame: Understanding Amnesty International. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Huault, I., Perret, V., & Spicer, A. (2014). Beyond macro- and micro-emancipation: 
Rethinking emancipation in organization studies. Organization, 21, 22–49.  
Hunt, S., & Benford, R. (2007). Collective identity, solidarity and commitment. In D. 
Snow, S. Soule & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social movements 
(pp. 433–458), 2nd edition. Oxford:Blackwell Publishing.  
Ibarra-Colado, E., Clegg, S., Rhodes, C., & Kornberger, M. (2006). The ethics of 
managerial subjectivity. Journal of Business Ethics, 64, 45–55.  
Iedema, R., & Rhodes, C. (2010). The undecided space of ethics in organizational 
surveillance. Organization Studies, 31, 199–217.  
Jasper, J. (1998). The emotions of protest: Affective and reactive emotions in and 
around social movements. Sociological Review, 13, 397–422.  
Jasper, J., & Poulson, J. (1995). Recruiting strangers and friends: Moral shocks and 
social networks in animal rights and anti-nuclear protests. Social Problems, 42, 493–
512.  
Jordan, G., & Malony, W. (2006). Letting George do it: Does Olson explain low 
levels of participation? Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 16, 115–140.  
King, M., & Haveman, H. (2008). Antislavery in America: The press, the pulpit, and 
the rise of antislavery societies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 53, 492–528. 
Knights, D. (2002). Writing organizational analysis into Foucault. Organization, 9, 
575–593.  
Kosmala, K., & McKernan, J. (2011). From care of the self to care for the others: 
Neglected aspects of Foucault’s late work. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, 2, 377–402.  
Loacker, B., & Muhr, S. (2009). How can I become a responsible subject? Towards a 
practice-based ethics of responsiveness. Journal of Business Ethics, 90, 265–277.  
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J., & Zald, M. (1996). Comparative perspectives on social 
movements. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Maharawal, M. (2013). Occupy Wall Street and a radical politics of inclusion. 
Sociological Quarterly, 54, 177–181. 
Mason, P. (2012). Why it’s kicking off everywhere: The new global revolutions. 
London: Verso.  
McAdam, D., & Scott, W. (2005). Organizations and movements. In G. Davis, D. 
McAdam, W. Scott, & M. Zald (Eds.), Social movement organization theory (pp.1–
40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
McGee, M. (2005). Self-Help Inc. Makeover culture in American life. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
McKinlay, A. (2002). Dead selves: The birth of the modern career. Organization, 9, 
595–614.  
McKinlay, A. (2012). ‘Little cogs’: Bureaucracy and the career in British banking, c. 
1900–1950. In Thomas Diefenbach & Rune Todnem By (Eds.), Reinventing 
hierarchy and bureaucracy – From the bureau to network organizations (pp. 31–57). 
Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.  
McMurray, R., Pullen, A., & Rhodes, C. (2010). Ethical subjectivity and politics in 
organizations: A case of health care tendering. Organization, 18, 541–561.  
McVeigh, R. (2011). How Occupy Wall Street works: Why it will remain nonviolent. 
Foreign Affairs Magazine.  
Melucci, A. (1988). Getting involved: Identity and mobilization in social movements. 
In B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi & S. Tarrow (Eds.), International social movement 
research: A research annual (pp. 329–348). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.  
Melucci, A. (1989). Nomads of the present: Social movements and individual needs 
in contemporary society. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.  
Melucci, A. (1996). Challenging codes: Collective action in the information age. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Miller, P., & O’Leary, T. (1987). Accounting and the construction of the governable 
person. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 12, 235–265.  
Miller, P., & Rose, N. (1988). The Tavistock Programme: The government of 
subjectivity. Sociology, 22, 171–192.  
Panagia, D. (2009). The political life of sensation. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press.  
Paxson, H. (2005). Slow food in a fat society: Satisfying ethical appetites. 
Gastronomica: The Journal of Food and Culture, 5(1), 14–18.  
Polletta, F., & Jasper, J. (2001). Collective identity and social movements. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 27, 283–305.  
Pulido, L. (2003). The interior life of politics. Ethics, Place and Environment, 6, 46–
52.  
Randall, J., & Munro, I. (2010). Foucault’s care of the self: A case from mental health 
work. Organization Studies, 31, 1485–1504.  
Rose, N. (1990). Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self. London: 
Routledge.  
Ross, K. (2002). May ‘68 and its afterlives. London: University of Chicago Press. 
Ruggerio, G. (2012). Editor’s Note. In N. Chomsky, Occupy. London: Penguin 
Books.  
Sage, G. (1990). Power and ideology in American sport: A critical perspective. 
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Books.  
Savage, M. (1998). Discipline, surveillance and the ‘career’: Employment on the 
Great Western Railway 1833–1914. In A. McKinlay & K. Starkey (Eds.), Foucault, 
management and organization theory (pp. 65–92). London: SAGE Publications. 
Schneider, N. (2011). From Occupy Wall Street to Occupy Everywhere. The Nation, 
10 October 2011.  
Scully, M., & Creed, W. (2005). Subverting our stories. In G. Davis, D. McAdam, W. 
Scott, & M. Zald (Eds.), Social movement organization theory (pp. 310–332). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Sloterdijk, P. (1988). Critique of cynical reason. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press.  
SlowFood (2009). The Slow Food Manifesto: International movement for the defense 
of and the right to pleasure, 
http://www.slowfood.com/filemanager/official_docs/SF_Manifesto_ENG.pdf. 
SlowFood (2010). To the Origins and Taste, 
http://www.slowfood.com/education/filemanager/resources/Origini_Gusto_eng.pdf.  
Snow, D., Rocheford, E., Worden, S., & Benford, R. (1986). Alignment processes, 
micromobilization and movement participation, American Sociological Review, 51, 
464–481.  
Soule, S. (2012). Social movements and markets, industries and firms. Organization 
Studies, 33, 1715–1734. 
Spicer, A., Alvesson, M., & Karreman, D. (2009). Critical performativity: The 
unfinished business of critical management studies, Human Relations, 62, 537–560. 
Spicer, A., & Böhm, S. (2007). Moving management: Theorizing struggles against the 
hegemony of management. Organization Studies, 28, 1667–1698. 
Starkey, K., & Hatchuel, A. (2002). The long detour: Foucault’s history of desire and 
pleasure, Organization, 9, 641–656. 
Stronzake, J. (2012). People make the occupation, and the occupation makes the 
people. In K. Khatib, M. Killjoy, & M. McGuire (Eds.), We are many: Reflections on 
movement strategy from occupation to lib- eration (pp. 115–122). Oakland, CA: AK 
Press. 
Tarrow, S. (2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics, 
3rd edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Townley, B. (1994). Reframing human resource management: Power, ethics and the 
subject at work. London: SAGE Publications. 
Treibitz, J. (2012). The art of cultural resistance. In K. Khatib, M. Killjoy & M. 
McGuire (Eds.), We are many: Reflections on movement strategy from occupation to 
liberation (pp. 325–336). Oakland, CA: AK Press. 
Valverde, M. (1999). Derrida’s justice and Foucault’s freedom: Ethics, history, and 
social movements. Law and Social Inquiry, 24, 655–676. 
Van Bommel, K., & Spicer, A. (2011). Hail the snail: Hegemonic struggles in the 
Slow Food Movement. Organization Studies, 32, 1717–1744. 
Veyne, P. (1993). The final Foucault and his ethics. Critical Inquiry, 20, 1–9. Veyne, 
P. (2010). Foucault: His thought, his character. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Weber, M. (1922/1993). The sociology of religion. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Weber, M. (1939/1992). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge. Weber, M. (1948/1991). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology, H. 
H Girth & C. Wright Mills (Eds.). London: Routledge.  
Weiskopf, R., & Willmott, H. (2013). Ethics as critical practice: The ‘Pentagon 
Papers’, deciding responsibly, truth-telling, and the unsettling of organizational 
morality. Organization Studies, 34, 469–494.  
Welch, M. (2011). Counterveillance: How Foucault and the Groupe d’Information sur 
les Prisons reversed the optics. Theoretical Criminology, 15, 301–313.  
Wray-Bliss, Edward (2002). Abstract ethics, embodied ethics: The strange marriage 
of Foucault and Positivism in labour process theory. Organization, 9, 5–39.  
Zizek, S. (2012). The year of dreaming dangerously. London: Verso Books. 
 
Author biography 
Iain Munro is Professor of Leadership and Organizational Change at the Newcastle 
University Business School, UK. He has research and teaching interests in 
Foucauldian and post-structuralist approaches to the study of organization, 
information warfare and systems thinking. He has published in journals including 
Organization, Organization Studies, Human Relations and the Journal of Business 
Ethics. 
 
 
